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RECOVERY UNDER THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
I. Introduction
The real property and tort law principles which until recently
governed the legal relationship between landlord and tenant left ten-
ants with no recourse against landlords who provided uninhabitable
premises.' Gradually, courts began to relieve the harsh consequences
of this rule by implying a warranty of habitability in residential
leases. The New York State legislature codified the implied warranty
of habitability 2 in Real Property Law section 235-b,3 but failed to
specify the remedies available for a breach. As a result, courts have
been forced to decide issues relating to recovery without statutory
1. This issue has been discussed widely elsewhere. See, e.g., Lesar, The Landlord-
Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9
U. KAN. L. REV. 369 (1961); Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises:
Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 19 [hereinafter
cited as Love]; Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969);
Comment, Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 16
VILL. L. REV. 710 (1971). In this Note, the definition of "habitability" is taken from
the New York implied warranty of habitability. N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 235-b
(McKinney Supp. 1981-82). For the text of this provision, see note 3 infra.
2. A warranty promises indemnity against defects in an article for sale. Joseph v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583 (1953). It is a statement of
something which, though collateral to the contract, forms a part of it, and it maybe
express or implied. Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger, 118 N.Y. 260, 23 N.E. 372
(1890).
3. Section 235-b provides:
1. In every written or oral lease or rental agreement for residential prem-
ises the landlord or lessor shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that
the premises so leased or rented and all areas used in connection therewith
in common with other tenants or residents are fit for human habitation
and for the uses reasonably intended by the parties and that the occupants
of such premises shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be
dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to their life, health or safety. When
any such condition has been caused by the misconduct of the tenant or
lessee or persons under his direction or control, it shall not constitute a'
breach of such covenants and warranties.
2. Any agreement by a lessee or tenant of a dwelling waiving or modifying
his rights as set forth in this section shall be void as contrary to public
policy.
3. In determining the amount of damages sustained by a tenant as a result
of a breach of the warranty set forth in this section, the court need not
require any expert testimony.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). Subsection 3 was added to
the implied warranty in 1976.
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guidance. Open questions include: whether strict liability should be
imposed, the extent to which third parties should be able to recover,
and the propriety of punitive damages. 4
This Note examines the development of the implied warranty of
habitability as a basis for expanding a landlord's liability for failure to
provide habitable premises and discusses problems relating to recov-
ery for breach of the implied warranty which have arisen in New York
courts. It argues that, although principles of strict liability should be
imposed within the context of the implied warranty, recovery should
be limited to tenants and intended third party occupants. In addition,
punitive damages should not be awarded under a strict liability theory
unless malice is established. The added protection which strict liabil-
ity provides must be limited to the landlord-tenant relationship.
II. The Evolution of Landlord-Tenant Law
Under traditional principles of real property law 5 a lease was con-
sidered a conveyance of real property for a specified period of time6
and landlords were held to a minimal duty-to deliver possession and
warrant quiet enjoyment. 7 Landlord liability was not necessary be-
cause structures were of secondary importance,8 and tenants, for the
4. In view of the dearth of meaningful legislative history to supplement the
language of the statute, courts have relied on the policies expressed in the New York
Court of Appeals' decision, Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d
316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979), to
construct broad rules of law.
5. American landlord-tenant law is derived from the feudal property law of
England. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d
316, 323, 391 NE.2d 1288, 1291, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 313 (1979). American colonists
were reluctant to adopt the English common law. 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 45 (1977); 1 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 12 (1980); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.40, at 55 (A. J. Casner ed.
1952). Forty-nine states, however, have accepted the common law by statute, consti-
tution, or judicial decision. Louisiana has adopted the common law in some areas. 1
C. THOMPSON, supra, § 13.
6. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 141, 265 A.2d 526, 532 (1970); see generally
Lesar, supra note 1, at 371.
7. Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d at 322, 391 N.E.2d at
1291, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 313. This was suitable to the agrarian landlord-tenant rela-
tionship because a lease was often a transfer of land for agricultural purposes to one
who cultivated the land and paid rent from the proceeds. Thus, courts would not
imply a covenant of fitness for intended use, nor would the landlord be liable for
maintenance of the premises. See notes 8-14 infra and accompanying text. Love,
supra note 1, at 26.
8. Id. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1074; Park West Manage-
ment Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d at 323, 391 N.E.2d at 1291, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
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most part, had the skill, time and financial resources to make neces-
sary repairs.9 Courts applied the doctrine of caveat emptor 0 to the
landlord-tenant relationship" and interpreted lease instruments as
reflecting the entire agreement of the parties because prospective
tenants could examine the premises and exact express warranties. 12
Pursuant to this doctrine which became known as "caveat lessee"
courts refused to require that premises be adapted to the purposes for
which they were rented at the commencement of the lease term.' 3
Furthermore, they declined to hold landlords to a duty to maintain
the premises in a habitable condition during the period of the lease.' 4
The shift of population from rural settings to large metropolises 15
has dramatically altered the desires, needs and expectations of the
9. Love, supra note 1, at 28.
10. Although courts originally applied the doctrine of caveat emptor to the sale of
chattels, they sought to protect the legitimate expectations of the buyer and therefore
expanded the seller's responsibilities by implying warranties of merchantability and
fitness for use into contracts for sale. See generally Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair:
Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARV. L. REV. 669, 678-79(1949). A warranty of merchantability "require[s] that the goods should be saleable
as goods of the general kind which they were described or supposed to be when
purchased, or reasonably suitable for the ordinary uses for which they were manufac-
tured." Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Develop-
ments, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 504 (1962). See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314 (McKin-
ney 1964). A warranty of fitness for use requires that a chattel be fit for the purpose
for which the goods are to be used by the buyer. See Jaeger, supra, at 506-07. See,
e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-315 (McKinney 1964).
11. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 451, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969);
Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 382, 140 A.2d 199, 201 (1958); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 3.45; TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT§ 86 (1912) [hereinafter cited as TIFFANY]; Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VAL. U. L. REV.
189 (1968); Love, supra note 1, at 28. "Since rules of property law solidified before
the development of mutually dependent covenants in contract law, theoretically once
an estate was leased, there were no further unexecuted acts to be performed by the
landlord and there could be no failure of consideration." Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 429, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (1969), citing 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (3d
ed. 1962).
12. Edwards v. McLean, 122 N.Y. 302, 25 N.E. 483 (1890); Franklin v. Brown,
118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889); Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N.Y. 398 (1874). See
generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 3.45; Comment, Tenant
Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 16 VILL. L. REV. 710,
711 (1971).
13. Doyle v. Union P. Ry., 147 U.S. 413, 423 (1893); Daly v. Wise, 132 N.Y. 306,
30 N.E. 837 (1892); Edwards v. New York and Harlem R.R., 98 N.Y. 245 (1885).
The tenant did have the right to inspect the premises or secure express covenants. 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.45.
14. Daly v. Wise, 132 N.Y. 306, 30 N.E. 837 (1892).
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tenant, most notably the residential tenant. 16 Moreover, the rising
significance of structures on leased land signalled a necessary depar-
ture from feudal real property law. 17 Leases began to assume the
appearance of a contract 8 as comparatively complex leases, with an
15. The following table illustrates this shift.
URBAN POPULATION GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES (in millions)
Urban as a
Urban Rural percent of total
Year population population population
1790 .2 3.7 5
1810 .5 6.7 7
1830 1.1 11.7 9
1850 3.5 19.6 15
1870 9.9 28.7 25
1890 22.1 40.8 35
1910 42.0 50.0 46
1930 69.0 53.8 56
1950 96.5 54.2 64
1970 149.8 53.9 73
1980 197.0 53.0 79
"Urban areas" are defined by the Census Bureau as cities and other incorporated
places which have 2,500 or more inhabitants.
United States Bureau of the Census cited in C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS-PRINcI-
PLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 707 (6th ed. 1975).
16. "When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they
seek a well known package of goods and services-a package which includes not
merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable
plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper main-
tenance." Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1074 (footnote omitted). See
also Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d at 323, 391 N.E.2d at
1291, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
17. Comment, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract, 16 TEX. L.
REV. 47 (1937). "While the English tenant was primarily interested in the use of the
land, from which the rent was said to 'issue,' the modern urban lessee is most vitally
interested in the buildings thereon." Id. at 47 (footnote omitted). See also 2 R.
POWELL, supra note 5, § 221[1].
18. Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d at 324, 391 N.E.2d at
1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314. One commentator has described the nature of the real
property lease as changing from "status to contract to property to modern contract."
Lesar, supra note 1, at 377. According to early English feudal law, the "tenant in
villeinage" was a tenant as long as the lord allowed him to remain. Id. at 369. Thus,
he had status but no contract or property rights. Subsequently, agrarian leases
developed into contracts which "connoted the unimportance of buildings, gave rise to
the concept of rent as 'issuing out of the land,' and, in general, caused the lease to
have primarily a contractual significance .... 2 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 221[1].
Since the sixteenth century, however, the lessee's rights have been as fully protected
as one having a possessory interest. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 5, §
3.11. Thus, the lease came to be considered a conveyance of real property. TIFFANY,
supra note 11, § 16.
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increased number of lease covenants,19 evolved in order to delineate
the landlords' obligations and liabilities. Courts and legislative bodies
in recent years, however, have sought to protect tenants by implying a
warranty of habitability in residential leases because many tenants are
uneducated and unaware of the necessity of obtaining express warran-
ties from landlords.2 0 This implied warranty operates independently
of any express warranties agreed to by the parties and shifted the law
of landlord-tenant from caveat lessee to caveat lessor. 21
Growing dissatisfaction with caveat lessee became evident as more
and more jurisdictions created exceptions to the doctrine. 22  The first
19. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 221[1]. Courts have acknowledged recently that
in modern times a tenant seeks a combination of goods and services, giving the lease
more the appearance of a contract.
20. See, e.g., Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d at 324-25, 391
N.E.2d at 1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
21. This shift has been noted elsewhere. See Note, Fakhoury v. Magner: From
Caveat Emptor to Caveat Lessor-Strict Liability and the Landlord, 9 CALIF. W.L.
REV. 547 (1973).
22. Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (1843) (implied condition in the lease of
a furnished house that it be reasonably fit for habitation); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 3.45; Love, supra note 1, at 29-31; Comment, Implied
Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant, 40
FoRDHAM L. REV. 123 (1971) (discussing another mitigating doctrine, constructive
eviction).
Despite the contrivance of carving exceptions to feudal principles, courts were
reluctant to abandon common law principles. The most common exception relied
upon by the courts was given for a short term lease for a furnished house. See, e.g.,
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). The Massachusetts court
reasoned that:
[o]ne who lets for a short term a house provided with all furnishings and
appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in
reference to a well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habita-
tion. An important part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to
enjoy it without delay, and without the expense of preparing it for use. It
is very difficult, and often impossible, for one to determine on inspection
whether the house and its appointments are fit for the use for which they
are immediately wanted, and the doctrine caveat emptor, which is ordi-
narily applicable to a lessee of real estate, would often work injustice if
applied to cases of this kind.
Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286. Other exceptions included the lease of a building to be
used for a particular purpose when the structure is still under construction at the
commencement of the lease, see, e.g., J. D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d
460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (1933) (because
construction had not progressed to a point at which the appellant could inspect the
building, it cannot be said that he took the building at his own risk); and when the
landlord knew of a defect and failed to disclose it to the tenant, see, e.g., Gamble-
Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, 65 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1933). The defect had to be
non-discoverable upon an ordinary inspection by the tenant. Love, supra note 1, at
31. In some jurisdictions constructive notice to the landlord was insufficient. Id. For
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major departure 23 from principles which favored landlords was a
example, in Zatloff v. Winkleman, 90 R.I. 403, 158 A.2d 874 (1960), the court
refused to imply a warranty even in a short term lease. The court therefore held that
no liability should result where there is no warrant because liability is based on
contract. One commentator has noted, "Most courts refuse to alter the common law,
stating that any contrary doctrine must come from the legislative body." 1 G.
THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 12. But see Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 432, 462
P.2d 470, 473 (1969) (rejecting caveat lessee and stating that the exceptions to the
doctrine are artificial); State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 583, 115 N.W.2d 505, 514
(1962) ("[E]stablished common law rules will be followed unless after thorough
consideration the court is convinced that new circumstances and needs of our society
require a change .. ").
23. Several early decisions modified the traditional role of non-liability for failure
to repair. In Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 935 (1953), the court refused to find a landlord liable for injuries sustained by a
tenant due to a defect which arose during the term of the lease in the absence of
fraud, concealment, or an agreement to repair. Id. at 324. The dissent, however,
noted the complete eradication of caveat emptor with respect to the sale of chattels
and the partial eradication of caveat lessee with respect to the duty of a landlord to
disclose dangerous defects present at the commencement of the lease term of which
the landlord had knowledge. The dissent advocated a complete abandonment of
caveat lessee, reasoning that
[i]n order to keep pace, the law should recognize that when one pays for
the temporary use of a dwelling, the parties contemplate that insofar as
reasonable care on the part of the owner can assure it, the dwelling will be
safe and habitable, not only at the time of possession is delivered [sic] but
throughout the period for which payment is made.
202 F.2d at 326 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). In Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111
N.W.2d 409 (1961), tenants entered into a one-year lease of a furnished house
without inspecting the premises, having been assured that the house would be
cleaned and repaired before the period covered by the lease commenced. When that
time arrived, the tenants discovered the existence of several building code violations.
The court recited the common law rule of caveat lessee and the furnished house
exception, see note 22 supra. Rather than relying on the well-established exception,
the court posited that the legislature, by enacting building codes and health regula-
tions, had made a policy judgment that rendered caveat lessee obsolete. Id. at -,
111 N.W.2d at 412-13. Thus, the building code violations breached a warranty of
habitability which should be implied into the lease. The court ruled that the tenants'
covenant to pay rent and the landlord's covenant to provide a habitable dwelling
were mutually dependent. Id. at -, 111 N.W.2d at 413. Therefore, the tenants
were absolved from liability to pay rent. See generally Cunningham, The New
Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Con-
tract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 9 (1979). But see Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d
172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970) (holding, without mentioning the Pines decision, that
the legislature did not intend to give tenants a private remedy for housing code
violations). Occasionally, a court has recognized the implied warranty of habitability
to be coextensive with the common law doctrine of constructive eviction. A construc-
tive eviction occurs when the tenant elects to surrender possession because of a
disturbance by the landlord whereby the premises are rendered unfit for human
habitation, in whole or in part, for the purposes for which they are leased. Murry v.
Merchants S.W. Transfer & Storage Co., 98 Okl. 270, 272, 225 P. 547, 549 (1924). In
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969), a commercial
tenant vacated his premises after rain leakage caused severe flooding. The court
upheld the constructive eviction of the tenant on the grounds of a breach of the
common law covenant of quiet enjoyment. Id. at 458, 251 A.2d at 275. See note 7
supra and accompanying text. In dicta, the court also indicated that it would
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decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia which ruled that leases are contracts rather than convey-
ances of real property. 24 The court reasoned that, according to con-
tract principles, the tenant's obligation to pay rent was dependent
upon the landlord's performance of his duties. 25 Most importantly,
however, the court held that housing regulations should be implied
into housing contracts and considered a contractual obligation of the
landlord. 2 6
In adopting the implied warranty of habitability, courts and legis-
lative bodies use a variety of rationales. 27  Some view the enactment
of housing codes as a policy judgment by the legislature that landlords
must keep their premises habitable, 28 while others emphasize chang-
ing conditions of society which led to housing shortgages and an
inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant. 29 An-
recognize an implied warranty against latent defects in leases of commercial prem-
ises. 53 N.J. at 451-53, 251 A.2d at 272. In Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462
P.2d 470 (1969), the Supreme Court of Hawaii did not consider the finding of the
trial court that a constructive eviction had occurred when a tenant vacated the
apartment when he discovered severe rat infestation,
in light of the decision of this court that there was an implied warranty of
habitability in this case. The doctrine of constructive eviction, as an
admitted judicial fiction designed to operate as though there were a sub-
stantial breach of a material covenant in a bilateral contract, no longer
serves its purpose when the more flexible concept of implied warranty of
habitability is legally available.
Id. at 434, 462 P.2d at 475. See also Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 475-76, 462
P.2d 482, 483 (1969) (extension of implied warranty of habitability to cover unfur-
nished as well as furnished dwellings "because [t]he common law distinction on this
ground is not in accord with the current realities of life in Hawaii"). The remedy for
a constructive eviction is suspension of rent. Park West Management Corp. v. Mitch-
ell, 47 N.Y.2d at 324, 391 N.E.2d at 1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Courts, however,
consider the remedy to be ineffectual in urban areas because: (1) the tenant has to
abandon the premises; (2) the justifiability of a tenant's abandonment is subject to
judicial determination, and if a court decides it to be unreasonable, the tenant is
liable for the unpaid rent; and (3) in a market where the demand for housing far
exceeds the supply, mere recission of a lease provides little incentive for a landlord to
make repairs. Id.
24. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
25. The case was remanded to determine if the tenant was liable for all or part of
the rent. Id. at 1083.
26. "We believe, in any event, that the District's housing code requires that a
warranty of habitability be implied in the leases of all housing that it covers." Id. at
1080.
27. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 225 [2], at 256.
28. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1080; Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.
2d at -, 111 N.W.2d at 412. But see Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 Ill. App. 3d 644, 356
N.E.2d 575 (1976).
29. Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288,
418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
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other approach has been to analogize the landlord-tenant relationship
to the field of products liability where warranties are implied in
contracts for the sale of goods.30 At least forty jurisdictions have
recognized the implied warranty of habitability either at common
law 3' or by statute. 32
The transformation of the nature of the housing market occasioned by
rapid urbanization and population growth was further impetus for the
change. Well-documented shortages of low- and middle-income housing
in many of our urban centers has [sic] placed landlords in a vastly superior
bargaining position, leaving tenants virtually powerless to compel the
performance of essential services. Because there is but a minimal threat of
vacancies, the landlord has little incentive to voluntarily make repairs or
ensure the performance of essential services.
Id. at 324-25, 391 N.E.2d at 1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
30. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
31. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974);
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Kline v.
Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1970); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 166 (1973); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409
(1961). But see Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
32. Some jurisdictions have passed statutes which actually imply warranties or
covenants of habitability into leases. IDAHO CODE § 6-320 (1979); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (Supp. 1981); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney
Supp. 1981-82). Other jurisdictions merely provide that the premises shall be main-
tained by the landlord so that they are fit for human habitation or that conditions
hazardous to the health and safety of the tenant shall not exist. MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 8-211 (Supp. 1980); S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 43-32-8 (Supp. 1981); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f (Vernon Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30
(Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 1981). Several states have adopted,
often with modifications, the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code or the Uni-
form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which require the landlord to do what-
ever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (1975); Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1324
(1974); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 (West Supp. 1981); Delaware:
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (1975); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (West
Supp. 1981); Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-42 (1977); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §
562A.15 (West Supp. 1981); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (1976); Kentucky:
Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.595 (Supp. 1980); Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 42-420
(Supp. 1977); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1419 (1976); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 118A.290 (1979); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20 (1978); North Dakota:
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1978); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Page
1981); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 117 (West Supp. 1980); Oregon: On.
REV. STAT. § 91.770 (1979); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2824 (1976); Vir-
ginia: VA. CODE § 55-248.13 (1981); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
59.18.060 (Supp. 1981). Other states have enacted statutes which are based on
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Landlord immunity under real property law was mirrored in tort.
At common law, an owner of premises was only held liable 33 for
injuries to a tenant due to a defect in the premises if there had been a
failure to perform some duty owed to the injured tenant. 34  As a
result, the landlord bore no duty whatsoever with respect to the
upkeep of the land from the time possession and control of the prem-
ises was surrendered to the tenant until the expiration of the lease
term. 35  Common law exceptions 36 and statutory provisions, how-
housing codes, Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 34-18-16 (1970) (landlords covenant
to comply with minimum housing codes), often giving the tenant a private remedy
for the landlord's violation of the code. Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §
127c ff., ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 441.510 (Vernon Supp. 1981); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:13-d
(Supp. 1979); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977).
33. Indeed, in feudal times the ownership of land was a sacred right and it
classified one as an exclusive and dominant member of society. Scurti v. City of New
York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 354 N.E.2d 794, 796, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (1976), citing 2
HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.3, at 1438 (1956). Cf. McGuinness v.
Jakubiak, 106 Misc. 2d 317, 431 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1980) (imposi-
tion of strict liability); Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Civ.
Ct. Bronx County 1976) (imposition of strict liability).
34. Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 935 (1953).
35. Under the warranty of quiet enjoyment, the landlord relinquished even the
right to enter the premises. See note 7 supra. W. PRossEn, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 63 (4th ed. 1971). A landlord's non-liability in tort flowed logically from the
concept of caveat emptor. At common law, a vendor of real estate was not liable for
personal injury caused by a defect in the premises existing at the time of transfer of
possession. Kilmer v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908 (1930). See generally Love,
supra note 1, at 118. Unless a tenant obtained an express warranty from the landlord,
he took the land as he found it, i.e., there were no implied warranties. Trustees of the
Village of Canandaigua v. Foster, 156 N.Y. 354, 360, 50 N.E. 971, 972 (1898); Love,
supra note 1, at 112. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
36. These exceptions included: (1) dangerous defects known to the lessor at the
time of the leasing and concealed from the tenant, Dunson v. Friedlander Realty,
369 So. 2d 792 (Ala. 1979); Edwards v. New York and H.R.R., 98 N.Y. 245 (1885);
Potter v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 233 A.D. 578, 253 N.Y.S. 394 (1931); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965); (2) conditions dangerous to those outside the
premises, Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950) (stone block falling
from parapet); Wells v. Ballou, 201 Mass. 244, 87 N.E. 576 (1909) (hole in sidewalk);
but see Appel v. Muller, 262 N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785 (1933) (holding that a landlord
is liable to persons injured outside the premises only if he has reserved the right to
re-enter the premises for the purpose of making repairs); (3) injuries received on
premises leased for admission of the public, Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213
N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915); Marshall v. Mastodon, Inc., 51 A.D.2d 21, 379
N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d Dep't 1976); (4) injuries received on parts of premises which
remain under the control of the landlord, (common hallways, approaches, etc.);
Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 397 A.2d 1335 (1978); Harrington v. 615 West
Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 476, 141 N.E.2d 602, 161 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1957); Loucks v. Dolan,
211 N.Y. 237, 105 N.E. 411 (1914); Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N.Y. 269, 29 N.E. 104
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ever, have expanded landlord tort liability. 37  In some jurisdictions
statutes determine landlord liability for the condition of the prem-
(1891); (5) injuries due to lessor's breach of an express agreement to repair, Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 258 N.W.2d 30 (1977); Michaels v. Brockchester
Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958); Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607, 345 N.E.2d
319, 381 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976); and (6) injuries caused by the landlord's negligent
repairs, whether or not he was bound to make such repairs, Brewer v. Bankord, 69
Ill. App. 3d 196, 387 N.E.2d 344 (1979); Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256,
157 N.E. 129 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965). If the facts of a
particular case did not fit any of these exceptions, courts declined to hold the
landlord liable because he had surrendered control over the area where the injury
occurred. Dick v. Sunbright Steam Laundry Corp., 307 N.Y. 422, 121 N.E.2d 399
(1954).
Courts, however, are growing dissatisfied with the common law exceptions and
are increasingly relegating them "to the history books where [they] more properly
belong." Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 396, 308 A.2d 528, 533 (1973) (calling the
general rule of landlord tort immunity an "anomaly," and the standard exceptions to
the rule too inflexible). Id. at 393, 308 A.2d at 532. In Chrysler Corp. v. M. Present
Co., 491 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1974), the court held that property which was open to
the public for storage of goods was within the public use exception to the general rule
of a landlord's tort immunity. The court remarked: "although the observed trend
seems almost always to involve cases of risk to bodily security, we think the trend also
makes less credible any prediction that exceptions to the rule of landlord nonliability
will be closely confined." Id. at 325.
37. See generally W. PnOSSER, supra note 35, § 63. Some courts, unwilling to
abandon caveat lessee with respect to the contractual relationship of the parties, were
willing to abolish the tort immunity of landlords. In 1898, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee drew a distinction between tort and contract liability of a landlord,
conceding immunity with regard to the latter while maintaining that there is a
ground of liability in tort for defects in existence at the beginning of the lease term:
It may be conceded that no ground of liability arises out of the contract
between the landlord and tenant in the absence of fraud or [express]
warranty, but a great number of cases in which the question has been
considered hold that there is an independent ground of liability, arising
out of the delictum or wrong of the landlord in leasing premises dangerous
at the time, and there is not necessarily any conflict between the two
classes of cases when properly understood.
Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 545-46, 46 S.W. 297, 299 (1898). The court
characterized the responsibility of landlords in such a situation as that of an "ordi-
nary care" of liability. Id. at 549, 46 S.W. at 299. Some courts extended the common
law exceptions to general landlord tort immunity to cover other situations. In Cum-
mings v. Prater, 95 Ariz. 20, 386 P.2d 27 (1963), the Supreme Court of Arizona
modified the obligations of a landlord to warn the tenant of dangerous defects known
to the lessor. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. The court held that the
landlord is not only under a duty to warn the tenant of defects of which he has actual
knowledge, but he also has a duty of ordinary care to inspect the premises if he has
reason to suspect defects existing at the time of the taking of the tenancy and to either
repair them or warn the tenant. Thus, the landlord was held to a standard of a
"reasonably prudent man under similar circumstances." 95 Ariz. at -, 386 P.2d at
31. See Note, Sargent v. Ross, 2 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 647, 653 (1974). Once the
landlord inspected and found a defect, however, his duty would have been fulfilled
by a mere warning to the tenant.
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ises. 38 Certain of these statutes expressly create a right to sue in tort. 39
Others create a duty on the part of the landlord to repair the premises,
the breach of which may create tort liability.
40
In the landmark decision of Sargent v. Ross, 41 landlord immunity in
tort was abandoned, A tenant sued her landlord for negligent con-
struction and maintenance when her daughter fell to her death from
38. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071(D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
39. See CA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-111, 61-112 (1979).
40. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2322, 2693, 2694, 2695 (West 1979); N.Y.
MULT. DWELL. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1974) and notes 52-59 infra and accompanying
text; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 1981). But see Thrash v. Hill, 63 Ohio St. 2d
178, 407 N.E.2d 495 (1980), holding that the Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Page 1981), which creates a duty to repair in the
landlord, does not create landlord tort liability. The dissent, however, argued that
"although the General Assembly may not have expressly abrogated the landlord's
common law tort immunity, it has certainly stripped away the underpinnings upon
which it is dependent." Id. at 186, 407 N.E.2d at 500. Early decisions used housing
codes as a basis for holding landlords liable in tort, see, e.g., Pharm v. Lituchy, 283
N.Y. 130, 27 N.E.2d 811, 20 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1940), and as a basis for implying a
warranty of habitability in residential leases. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
In addition to imposing liability, repair statutes may provide for private remedies.
See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2322, 2695 (West 1979). One view is that the
omission of a private remedy by the legislature indicates that no such action was
intended. Feuerstein & Shestack, Landlord and Tenant-The Statutory Duty to
Repair, 45 ILL. L. REV. 205, 209 (1950). The other view is that the legislature did not
address the issue, and therefore has not precluded a private right. Id. In New York,
for example, the only entity able to commence a criminal proceeding for violations of
the New York Multiple Dwelling Law is the agency responsible for enforcement of
the statute. City of New Rochelle v. Beckwith, 268 N.Y. 315, 197 N.E. 295 (1935).
Although a tenant who is physically injured as a result of a landlord's failure to
comply with the Multiple Dwelling Law may bring an action in civil court based on
negligence, he may not seek criminal enforcement of the provision itself. Altz v.
Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922). Tenants are not able to recover
compensatory damages for a landlord's violation of the law. Davar Holdings, Inc. v.
Cohen, 255 A.D. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911, aff'd, 280 N.Y. 828, 21 N.E.2d 882 (1939). "It
is, we believe, often assumed that a tenant denied the amonities [sic] of decent living
may have a direct cause of action against his landlord for the damages suffered. The
assumption is, however, false in this State." MEMORANDUM OF THE AsSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT, 1965 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 345, 352 [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE ON HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT]. In 1965, the Committee on Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, recognizing the inadequacy of remedies which do not create a private remedy
for the tenant, recommended the enactment of § 302-a of the Multiple Dwelling Law
providing for the abatement of rent in the case of serious violations. Id. at 353-55.
41. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). See generally Love, supra note 1, at
112-14; Note, Sargent v. Ross, 2 FoRDHAM URB. L. J. 647 (1974).
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an outdoor stairway.4 2 On appeal from a jury award for the plain-
tiff, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered the propriety
of two common law exceptions to the theory of landlord tort immu-
nity: whether the injuries were received in a common area under the
control of the landlord 43 and whether the negligent repairs exception
applied to negligent construction. 44 Rather than strain the "control
test 45 or broaden the "negligent repairs" exception to include the
negligent construction of improvements, 46 the court considered it
"more realistic" to abandon the general rule of nonliability.47  The
court also recognized that the landlord-tenant relationship is governed
by both real property and tort principles. Once the legislature
adopted the implied warranty of habitability eliminating caveat les-
see, the court reasoned, "the very legal foundation and justification
for the landlord's immunity in tort"48 was discarded.
42. 113 N.H. at 389, 308 A.2d at 529-30. Defendant landlord had constructed the
stairway approximately eight years prior to the incident.
43. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
44. Id.
45. 113 N.H. at 393, 308 A.2d at 532.
46. Id. at 395, 308 A.2d at 533. The court recognized that this "would be no great
leap in logic." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that
the abolition of tort immunity flows "naturally and inexorably" from its decision in
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971), which recognized an implied
warranty of habitability in an apartment lease transaction. 113 N.H. at 396, 308
A.2d at 533. Similarly, one commentator observed, "The policy considerations that
dictated the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability in the first place also
dictate the imposition of a duty to use reasonable care." Love, supra note 1, at 116.
See also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970), where the court discussed the legal rights and duties created by
housing regulations which were enforceable in tort by private parties. The only
logical reason for the continued existence of landlord tort immunity is an evident
reluctance of the courts to break with established law and precedent. The court
criticized the "somnolence" of the courts in perpetuating common law landlord tort
immunity. Searching for exceptions, the Sargent court reasoned, would only serve to
perpetuate fictions and hamper the development of preferable alternatives. 113 N.H.
at 395, 308 A.2d at 533.
The abiding respect of this court for precedent and stability in the law is
balanced by an appreciation of the need for responsible growth and
change in rules that have failed to keep pace with modern developments in
social and juridical thought .... "Finding no supportable rationale upon
which this judicially created exception to the ordinary rules of liability can
be predicated, justice demands and reason dictates that a change be made
from the previous holding in such a situation."
Id. at 398, 308 A.2d at 534-35, quoting Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 318, 211 A.2d
410, 413 (1965). Moreover, the court noted that abolishing landlord tort immunity
would be consistent with the trend that has eradicated immunity previously afforded
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III. The Implied Warranty of Habitability in New York
In 1929, the New York State Legislature mitigated the harsh conse-
quences of landlord tort immunity by enacting section 78 of the
Multiple Dwelling Law 49 which imposed a duty to repair on the
landlord. 0 Courts, however, did not construe the statute as creating
an action independent of negligence5 1 and required, actual or con-
structive notice to the landlord of the defective condition.5 2  As a
result of the inadequacy5 3 of existing statutory penalties 54 for housing
government entities, charitable organizations, family members, and landowners or
occupiers. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. at 396, 308 A.2d at 533. See also Old Town
Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 762 (Ind. App. 1976). See generally 2 HARPER
& JAMES, supra note 33, § 27.16, at 1508 (1956); Love, supra note 1, at 117-18.
49. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1974). The Multiple Dwelling Law
applies to buildings with three or more units in cities with a population of 325,000 or
more. Id. §§ 3(1), 4(7), 8 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). It superseded the Tenement
House Law of 1909. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 365-66(6) (McKinney 1974). The
Multiple Residence Law applies to buildings of three or more rental units in cities,
towns, and villages of less than 400,000 persons, N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW §§ 3(1),
4(33), 8 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82), and also establishes minimum housing require-
ments.
The owner shall keep all and every part of a dwelling and the lot on which
it is situated in good repair, clean and free from vermin, rodents, dirt,
filth, garbage or other thing or matter dangerous to life or health; but the
tenant shall also be liable if a violation is caused by his own wilful act,
assistance or negligence or that of any member of his family or household
or his guests.
Id. § 174.
The Multiple Residence Law, unlike the Multiple Dwelling Law, imposes a duty
to inspect multiple dwellings depending upon the needs of the particular community,
thus providing a more flexible system. Id. § 303.
50. "Every multiple dwelling, including its roof or roofs, and every part thereof
and the lot upon which it is situated, shall be kept in good repair." Id. § 78(1). See
notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
51. Pagan v. Goldberger, 51 A.D.2d 508, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1976). See also Davar
Holdings, Inc. v. Cohen, 255 A.D. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d, afJ'd, 280 N.Y. 828, 21 N.E. 2d
882, 10 N.Y.S. 2d - (1939) ("outside of the penalties fixed by the [Multiple Dwell-
ing Law], . . . liability . . . has been enlarged only to the extent of subjecting [the
landlord] to additional liabilities, not in contract, but in tort, with respect to the
tenant and others").
52. Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922); Becker v. Manufacturers
Trust Co., 262 A.D. 525 (1941) (need for notice implied).
53. Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 19, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 17 (Civ. Ct.
1971).
54. Penalties for violation of certain provisions constituted a misdemeanor and led
to a $500 fine, imprisonment up to 30 days, or both, for the first offense; $1000 fine,
imprisonment up to 60 days, or both, for subsequent offenses. N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
LAW § 304(1) (McKinney 1974). Penalties for specified lesser non-criminal offenses
were $50 for the first offense, $250 for a second offense or failure to remove, and $500
for subsequent offenses. Id. § 304(1-a). Violation of the Multiple Residence Law is a
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code violations, 55 courts began to imply a warranty of habitability
into residential leases in order to afford tenants a defense to nonpay-
ment eviction proceedings 5 and actions for unpaid rent. 57
The common law rule 58 of the implied warranty of habitability was
codified in section 235-b of the Real Property Law in 1975, 59 but
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment up to one year or
both. N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW § 304 (McKinney Supp. 1981). See generally, Note,
New York's Search for an Effective Implied Warranty of Habitability in Residential
Leases, 43 ALB. L. REV. 661, 672-75, 683-89 (1979), for a discussion of the Multiple
Residence Law, the Multiple Dwelling Law, and tort liability thereunder.
55. The New York state legislature has made apparent its increasing recognition of
the inadequacy of penal remedies through the enactment of various statutes. In 1962,
it passed § 755 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS. LAW § 755 (McKinney 1979), 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 312, which provides for a
stay of proceeding or action for rent when the landlord has failed to repair a
condition which is "or is likely to become, dangerous to life, health, or safety.
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 755(1)(a) (McKinney 1979).
In 1965, the legislature added § 302-a to the Multiple Dwelling Law, N.Y. MULT.
DWELL. LAW § 302-a (McKinney 1974), 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 911, which provides for
the abatement of rent in the case of serious violations which are allowed to exist for
more than six months.
56. Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 19, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 17 (Civ. Ct.
1971).
57. Cosmopolitan Assoc. v. Ortega, 90 Misc. 2d 437, 395 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Civ. Ct.
1977); Barasch v. Goldbetter, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 15, 1975, at 17, col. 3 (Civ. Ct.)
(discharge of duty to pay rent because of landlord's willful failure to keep roof in
repair); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct.
1973) (tenant allowed a setoff of 50% of rent due). In Cosmopolitan Assoc. v.
Ortega, the lease contained a provision in which the tenant waived his right to assert
counterclaims in any proceedings brought by the landlord. On the landlord's motion,
the court severed the tenant's counterclaim which was based on negligence, but
refused to sever the counterclaim based on the warranty of habitability.
Courts, however, have upheld waivers of jury trials in actions based on the
warranty of habitability. Pierre v. Williams, 106 Misc. 2d 81, 431 N.Y.S.2d 249
(Civ. Ct. 1980); Beach Haven Apts. No. 1, Inc. v. Isenberg, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1978,
at 18, col. 1 (Civ. Ct.). But see Dunbar Assoc. v. Mulzac, 93 Misc. 2d 870, 403
N.Y.S.2d 846 (Civ. Ct. 1978), holding that a waiver of a jury trial in a lease does not
apply to rights acquired after the enactment of § 235-b.
58. In a 1975 decision, Tonetti v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d
Dep't 1975), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York adopted the
implied warranty of habitability. The tenant had signed a three-year lease for the
rental of a private house where many dogs had been kept. When the tenant objected
to the lingering odor, the landlord assured him that it would be eliminated. When it
was not, the tenant decided to leave five days after he moved in. The landlord sought
to collect eight months rent, the period of time it took to re-rent the premises, plus
maintenance expenses. Affirming the decision of the supreme court, the appellate
division held that the defendant's liability for rent terminated when he quit the
premises because they were uninhabitable. 48 A.D.2d at 30, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
Analogizing to products liability law and the implied warranty of fitness for use, id.
at 29, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 807, the court expressly adopted the implied warranty of
habitability, declining to utilize the common law theory of constructive eviction. Id.
at 26, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 805; see note 23 supra for a discussion of constructive eviction.
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enforcement provisions were not adopted in order to allow the courts
the freedom to fashion remedies they deem appropriate. 60 In the only
New York Court of Appeals decision to interpret the implied war-
ranty, the court indicated that only serious impairment of habitability
should result in the finding of a breach.
In Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell,6 1 the landlord com-
menced a summary proceeding for nonpayment of rent when tenants
Recent lower court decisions have not reconciled § 235-b with the doctrine of
constructive eviction. In Popack v. D'Aguilar, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 28, 1975, at 11, col. 2
(Civ. Ct), the court seemed to view the tenant's decision not to abandon the premises
as evidence of the habitability of the dwelling. The court ruled that the tenant failed
to sustain a claim for breach of § 235-b because she neither surrendered possession
nor was deprived of the use of any part of the rented unit. In Cohen v. Werner, 82
Misc. 2d 295, 368 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Civ. Ct. 1975), the Civil Court of Queens County
relied on the implied warranty of habitability to terminate a tenant's liability for
rent. But the court relied on a recent case with similar facts, Rockrose Assoc. v.
Peters, 81 Misc.2d 971, 366 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), which held
that a constructive eviction had occurred. 82 Misc. 2d at 298, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
By contrast, the supreme court in affirming the civil court decision held that the
tenant had sustained his claim of a constructive eviction without even mentioning the
implied warranty of habitability. Cohen v. Werner, 85 Misc. 2d 341, 378 N.Y.S.2d
868 (Sup. Ct. 1975). But see 401 Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 368
N.Y.S.2d 122 (City Ct. Long Beach 1975). Although this case was decided before
adoption of the implied warranty of habitability, the City of Long Beach had an
ordinance providing for the warranty. The court stated that recovery under the
warranty did not require abandonment.
59. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). The rule that any
agreement waiving the warranty is void as contrary to public policy did not exist at
common law. See note 57 supra. Section 3 was added in 1976. See note 3 supra for
text of § 235-b.
60. "Many agreed that describing in detail the procedural matters only served to
raise a number of issues that could be better handled by the courts." Speech by
Senator H. Douglas Barclay, the principal sponsor of the bill, to the New York Senate
at 2 (June 17, 1975), cited in Note, New York's Search for an Effective Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Residential Leases, 43 ALB. L. REV. 661, 664-65 n.21
(1979). "We wish to leave the greatest degree of flexibility to the courts to fashion an
appropriate remedy in each case." Id. at 665 n.29.
It may have been possible to expressly provide for procedures and reme-
dies. However, the circumstances and situations in which tenants will be
seeking to enforce the warranty will take many forms. Tenants have
utilized the doctrine affirmatively as well as defensively; as a counter-
claim, set-off, and defense in non-payment of rent proceedings. The reme-
dies have been complete or partial abatement of rent and reimbursement
for repairs made by tenants themselves. It will be the courts' function to
fashion remedies appropriate to the facts of each case.
Governor's Memorandum of Approval, 1975 N.Y. LAWS 1761 (McKinney). The
principal sponsor of the bill, Senator H. Douglas Barclay, characterized it as "con-
sumer-oriented legislation"--a bill which will encourage landlords to maintain their
premises in a safe and sanitary condition. Memorandum of Senator H. Douglas
Barclay, 1975 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 315.
61. 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
992 (1979).
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withheld a month's rent in reaction to a strike by the building's entire
maintenance and janitorial staff. The New York sanitation depart-
ment refused to cross the picket lines and uncollected refuse accumu-
lated as high as the first floor windows of the building causing the
New York City Department of Health to declare a health emergency
at the apartment complex. 62  The tenants employed section 235-b in
two ways: first, as an affirmative defense, alleging that the landlord
failed to provide essential services and allowed unhealthy conditions
to exist on the premises; 63 and second, as a basis for a counterclaim for
damages. 64 In Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, the court
held that the alleged conditions breached the warranty and set forth
the test as being whether conditions that "materially affect" the ten-
ant's health and safety exist. 65 It emphasized, however, that viola-
tions of housing codes do not establish per se breaches of the implied
warranty. 86
As noted in Park West, there are myriad situations under which a
breach may occur. 7 Decisions following Park West have been incon-
sistent as to the degree of uninhabitability required to constitute a
breach of section 235-b, and no clear trend has emerged. For exam-
ple, courts have held inadequate security to be a breach of the war-
ranty where the landlord assumed the duty to provide protection and
obtained a rental increase for this purpose.6 8  Loud and excessive
62. As a result of the third-party strike, there were noxious odors, rats, roaches
and vermin. The New York City Civil Court determined that these conditions
violated the warranty and granted a 10% abatement of the month's rent to the
tenants. Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1977, at 10,
col. 3 (Civ. Ct.). Both the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, id. at 11, col. 1,
and the appellate division, 62 A.D.2d 291, 404 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1978), affirmed the
judgment. The appellate division gave three bases for its decision: first, the analogy
of a lease to a contract to purchase shelter and services suggests that a warranty of
habitability should be implied, just as a contract for sale requires an implied war-
ranty of fitness, 47 N.Y.2d at 324, 391 N.E.2d at 1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314; second,
the landlord has a superior bargaining position; and, third, a private remedy is
necessary to compel the landlord's compliance with housing codes and repair stat-
utes. Id. at 325, 391 N.E.2d at 1292, 418 N.Y.S. 2d at 314.
63. 47 N.Y.2d at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 1293, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
64. 62 A.D.2d at 293, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
65. 47 N.Y.2d at 328-29, 391 N.E.2d at 1294-95, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
66. 47 N.Y.2d at 328, 391 N.E.2d at 1294, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 316. "[N]o one will
dispute that health and safety are adversely affected by insect or rodent infestation,
insufficient heat and plumbing facilities, significantly dangerous electrical outlets or
wiring, [and] inadequate sanitation facilities. Id. at 328, 391 N.E.2d at 1294,
418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
67. 47 N.Y.2d at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 1294, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
68. Brownstein v. Edison, 103 Misc. 2d 316, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
The court emphasized that the landlord is not liable for all criminal acts committed
by an intruder within the apartment building. Id. at 318, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
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noise also may constitute a breach of the warranty.6 9  Courts have
even allowed rent abatements for a nonfunctioning stove, 70 defective
air conditioning, 71 and where it was alleged that a landlord's failure to
repair leaks, exterminate rodents, and provide heat had an "adverse
impact" on a tenant's life. 72 From these varied court decisions, it is
unclear whether the breach must pose a serious threat to the health
and safety of the tenant or represent a mere reduction in services.
A. Strict Liability Under Section 235-b
New York courts, once a breach of the implied warranty has been
found, have allowed injured parties to recover in tort. 73  They have
been split, however, on the issue of whether strict liability 4 should be
used as a theory75 of tort recovery in the absence of a statutory
See also Notre Dame Leasing Corp. v. Banzali, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 1976, at 15, col. 6
(Dist. Ct.).
69. Hohenberg v. 77 West 55th St. Assoc., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26, 1981, at 7, col. 3
(Trial Term); Kalikow Properties, Inc. v. Modny, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1978, at 5, col. 1
(App. Term); McQuade v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1981, at
11, col. 2 (Civ. Ct.); Central Park Gardens, Inc. v. Klein, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1981, at
10, col. 3 (Civ. Ct.); Mantica R Corp. NV v. Malone, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1980, at 12,
col. 5 (Civ. Ct.) (liability), 106 Misc. 2d 953, 436 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Civ. Ct. 1981)
(damages).
70. Hilary Gardens v. Dutcher, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1976, at 14, col. 2 (Civ. Ct.).
71. Devine v. Cirillo, N.Y.L.J., June 22, 1977, at 16, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.). The court
in Devine stated that it was not even necessary that the provision of air conditioning
be specified in the lease. Cf. Levine v. Ehrenberg, N.Y.L.J., June 11, 1973, at 18,
col. 2 (App. Term), a case decided before the adoption of § 235-b. The court allowed
a rent abatement for lack of elevator service, although it appears that such service
was provided for in the lease.
72. Blatt v. Fishkin, 101 Misc. 2d 888, 422 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Civ. Ct. 1979). The
court sustained the allegation as sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action. The court held that these words were substantially equiva-
lent to the statutory phrase "conditions . . . detrimental to life." Id. at 889, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 284.
73. See, e.g., Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607, 345 N.E.2d 319, 381 N.Y.S.2d 848
(1976); Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Civ. Ct. 1976).
74. For strict liability: McBride v. 218 E. 70th St. Assoc., 102 Misc. 2d 279, 425
N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Term 1979); McGuinness v. Jakubiak, 106 Misc. 2d 317, 431
N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1980); Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745,
381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1976).
Against strict liability: Curry v. New York City Hous. Auth., 77 A.D.2d 534, 430
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1st. Dep't. 1980); Villa Victoria Realty Co. v. Glass, N.Y.L.J., July 1,
1981, at 10, col. 6 (App. Term); N. Town Roosevelt Ass'n v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
27, 1980, at 6, col. 4 (App. Term). Segal v. Justice Court Mut. Hous. Co-op, Inc.,
105 Misc. 2d 453, 432 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1980); Zarlin Realty
Co. v: Napolitano, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 27, 1977, at 11, col. 3 (Civ. Ct.).
75.
There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame on either
side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice who can best bear the
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While Park West did not involve a question of landlord tort liabil-
ity, dictum in the decision suggests that strict liability may be an
appropriate theory of recovery:
The scope of the warranty includes ... conditions caused by both
latent and patent defects existing at the inception of and through-
out the tenancy. However, as the statute places an unqualified
obligation on the landlord to keep the premises habitable, condi-
tions occasioned by ordinary deterioration, work stoppages by em-
ployees, acts of third parties or natural disaster are within the scope
of the warranty as well. 7
Despite this language, no clear rule has emerged. One early section
235-b decision expressly approved the strict liability theory of recov-
ery.7 8  In Kaplan v. Coulston,79 a plaintiff was injured when a
loss, and hence to shift the loss by creating liability where there has been
no fault.
Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L.
REv. 195, 233 (1914). This policy forms the basis for imposing strict liability on a
defendant who is engaged in abnormally dangerous and ultrahazardous activities
which threaten unduly the safety of others, regardless of the precautions taken by the
defendant. W. PRossm, supra note 35, § 75, at 494.
76. Strict liability has been used in the area of products liability law as one theory
of recovery for several reasons. First, consumers of goods rely on the expertise of the
seller or manufacturer who is in a superior position to discover defects. Codling v.
Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). Courts require
that a products liability defendant be in the business of selling before imposing strict
liability. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, § 98; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A
(1965). In addition, the manufacturer is in a better position to bear the losses by
distributing among the public through insurance. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330,
298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). Finally, the plaintiff's burden of proving
negligence is removed. It may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove negligence when he
was not present at the time the duty of reasonable care was breached. Love, supra
note 1, at 136.
Other grounds of recovery in products liability law include negligence and breach
of warranty. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 298 N.E.2d 622, 624,
345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463-64 (1973). A smaller number of cases involve fraud or deceit,
Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N.E. 1098 (1905), and
misrepresentation, Sell v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 505 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1974).
77. 47 N.Y.2d at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 1294, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 316 (emphasis added).
78. Strict liability has been imposed for breach of implied warranties of habitabil-
ity in few jurisdictions. In Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr.
473 (1972), a lessee of a furnished apartment was injured when a couch in the
apartment collapsed due to defective supporting wires. The California court held the
landlord strictly liable, not as lessor of premises but as a lessor of defective furniture,
noting that the landlord, having leased five other furnished apartments with the
same type of couch, was in the business of leasing. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 101 Cal.
Rptr. at 476. The court posited that the same rationale used in holding lessors of
personal property strictly liable applied here. "[T]he injured persons are virtually
powerless to protect themselves; the lessor can recover the cost of protection by
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kitchen cabinet fell and struck her. The civil court, analogizing the
landlord-tenant relationship to a merchant-consumer transaction,
80
*cited several policies militating for strict liability: 81 first, a landlord is
charging for it in his business; and he has a better opportunity than does the injured
person of recouping from anyone primarily responsible for the defect." Id. at 64, 101
Cal. Rptr. at 477. For an extensive discussion of this decision, see Note, Fakhoury v.
Magner: From Caveat Emptor to Caveat Lessor-Strict Liability and the Landlord,
9 CALIF. W. L. REV. 547 (1973).
By contrast, in Dwyer v. Skyline Apts., Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 51, 301 A.2d 463,
464 aff'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973), the New Jersey Superior Court
declined to extend the same reasoning to hold a landlord strictly liable for a tenant's
personal injuries caused by a latent defect.
Such a landlord is not engaged in mass production whereby he places his
product-the apartment-in a stream of commerce exposing it to a large
number of consumers. He has not created the product with a defect which
is preventable by greater care at the time of manufacture or assembly. He
does not have the expertise to know and correct the condition, so as to be
saddled with responsibility for a defect regardless of negligence.
Id, at 55, 301 A.2d at 467. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that New
Jersey's adoption of the implied warranty of habitability, Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), created landlord tort liability. The court instead limited
application of the warranty to defenses in actions of eviction. 123 N.J. Super. at 54,
301 A.2d at 466. See generally Note, Dwyer v. Skyline Apts., Inc., 5 SETON HALL L.
REV. 409 (1974).
79. 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
80. Influential in determining whether strict liability should be allowed has been
the close relationship between section 235-b and the New York Uniform Commercial
Code implied warranty of merchantability for sale of goods. Notably, both provisions
contain language warranting that the subject of the contract is fit for use. Section
235-b warrants fitness of the premises for "uses reasonably intended by the parties,"
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981-82), while the U.C.C. war-
rants that goods for sale are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314 (McKinney 1964). The court of appeals has remarked,
[s]ince a lease is more akin to a purchase of shelter and services rather than
a conveyance of an estate, the law of sales, with its implied warranty of
fitness (Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-314) provides a ready analogy that
is better suited than the outdated law of property to determine the respec-
tive obligations of landlord and tenant.
Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d at 324, 391 N.E.2d at 1292,
418 N.Y.S.2d at 314. "We agree that the language of warranty in § 235-b was
adapted from the law of sales, with its implied warranty of fitness (Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-314) .. " Curry v. New York City Hous. Auth., 77 A.D.2d 534,
535, 430 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (1980). See also MeGuinness v. Jakubiak, 106 Misc. 2d
317, 322-23, 431 N.Y.S.2d 755, 759 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
81. The court also examined policies against strict liability: (1) a lease is not a sale
of a product; (2) an apartment may be very old; (3) defects may arise after the
letting; (4) in old buildings the landlord will not have recourse against the manufac-
turer or contractor; (5) a landlord should not be held liable if he was not on notice of
the defect. Id. at 748, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The court also cited the reasons given by
the New Jersey Superior Court in Dwyer v. Skyline Apts., Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48,
301 A.2d 463, aJf'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973), in refusing to hold the
landlord strictly liable. 85 Misc. 2d at 748-49, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37. See note 78
supra.
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in a superior position to prevent defects, as is a merchant; second, the
tenant, like the consumer, relies on the skill of the other party to the
transaction; 12 third, a landlord, like the products liability defendant,
is in a position to spread his losses; 83 and, finally, adoption of the
theory relieves the tenant of the difficulty of proving negligence.8 4
Similarly, the appellate term in McBride v. 218 E. 70th St. Assoc.,
found a landlord liable for property damages caused by flooding.8 5
The managing agent testified that the damage was caused by occur-
rences out of the control of the-landlord.86  Nevertheless, the court
held the landlord liable, stating that there "need be no showing that
the landlord acted in bad faith or contributed to the condition of the
premises. '87 They required no proof that the landlord contributed to
the defective condition of the premises and cited the reasoning in
Kaplan"8 with approval.8 9 Finally, in McGuinness v. Jakubiak,0 a
great rainstorm caused the tenant's apartment to be flooded with
water. The tenants tried, but were unable to save their furniture and
possessions. As a result, the tenants incurred extensive property dam-
age and were forced to vacate, thereby incurring extra living ex-
penses."1 The court, citing Kaplan and McBride, held the landlord
liable despite lack of notice of the condition. 92 It characterized Park
West's approach to a landlord's liability for breach of section 235-b as
"expansive rather than restrictive. 93
Despite these strong policies in favor of strict liability, most New
York courts have declined to impose strict liability for several reasons.
82. 85 Misc. 2d at 750, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 750-51, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638. Moreover, noted the court, it "would best
serve the interests of justice" to impose strict liability on the landlord. Id. at 752, 381
N.Y.S.2d at 638.
85. McBride v. 218 E. 70th St. Assoc., 102 Misc. 2d 279, 425 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App.
Term 1979).
86. First, that the tenant's apartment was "below grade"; second, that the dam-
age was caused by unusually heavy rainstorms coupled with an inadequate city sewer
system. Id. at 280-81, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
87. Id. at 283, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 912. It may, however, be of some significance that
the court noted that the landlord installed a "sump pump" after the events at issue
had occurred. Id. at 283, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
88. See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text.
89. 102 Misc. 2d at 282, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
90. 106 Misc. 2d 317, 431 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
91. 106 Misc. 2d at 318, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
92. The court noted that the landlord had purchased the property with knowledge
of some roof leakage, although the tenants in this case had not complained of roof
leaks with respect to their apartment. Id. The court asserted that the dictum in Park
West was consistent with Kaplan and indicated that the New York Court of Appeals
would rule in favor of strict liability. Id. at 324 n.5, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 760 n.5.
93. Id. at 324, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
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First, because section 78 of the Multiple Dwelling Law has not been
repealed, and the precedents requiring notice under that section 4 still
stand, a conflict would result if strict liability were imposed for
breach of section 235-b. 95 Second, imposition of such liability would
send high rents even higher due to the increase in insurance rates.""
Third, the legislature did not intend to impose strict tort liability on
the landlord but merely wished to provide tenants with "a direct and
expeditious method" of enforcing their rights. 97
One decision which rejected the applicability of strict liability was
Curry v. New York City Housing Authority.98 Although the observa-
tions of the supreme court, appellate division, constituted dicta, the
court's evident disapproval of such a theory of recovery nevertheless
has been influential. 9 In Curry, a two-year old plaintiff fell out of a
window of an apartment owned by the defendant and alleged that his
injuries resulted from a defective window. The plaintiff brought three
causes of action: common law negligence, violation of section 235-b,
and violation of a health code regulation requiring window guards.
The court dismissed this last cause of action because the provision had
been legally ineffective on the date of the injury and, therefore, also
dismissed the negligence allegation. As for the section 235-b cause of
action, while the court declined to determine whether the implied
warranty imposed strict liability on the landlord, 00 it observed:
94. As a general rule, proof of notice is not required in a strict tort liability action.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Love, supra note 1, at 150.
95. Segal v. Justice Court Mut. Hous. Co-op., 105 Misc. 2d 453, 432 N.Y.S.2d 463
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); Zarlin Realty Co. v. Napolitano, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 27,
1977, at 11, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
96. 105 Misc. 2d at 458, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 466-67; Zarlin Realty Co. v. Napolitano,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 27, 1977, at 11, col. 5. However, a comparison between the insurance
rates in Louisiana, which has had strict liability imposed on landlords for over a
century, LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1952), does not reveal a drastic rise in
the rates. Love, supra note 1, at 135 n.662.
97. Governor's Memorandum of Approval, 1975 N.Y. Laws 1760-61 quoted in
Hamel v. Schmidt, 106 Misc. 2d 315, 431 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1980). "And since
section 235-b RPL does not expressly address the tort liability to which a landlord's
statutory duty to repair gives rise, should legislative silence be treated as a mandate
to the courts to expand 235-b into a statute of strict liability?" Mahlmann v. Yelver-
ton, 109 Misc. 2d 127, 130, 439 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (Civ. Ct. 1980). See generally
Note, New York's Search for an Effective Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Residential Leases, 43 ALB. L. REv. 661 (1979).
98. 77 A.D.2d 534, 430 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1980) (mem.). The court of appeals,
however, has not yet squarely faced the issue.
99. Villa Victoria Realty Co. v. Glass, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1981, at 10, col. 6 (App.
Term); Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1981, at 11, col. 5 (App.
Term); N Town Roosevelt Assoc. v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 6, col. 4
(App. Term).
100. 77 A.D.2d at 536, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
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We agree that the language of warranty in § 235-b was adapted
from the law of sales, with its implied warranty of fitness (Uniform
Commercial Code, § 2-314), where it was the subject of a well-
known legal development in which strict liability was imposed on
those who manufacture or sell defective goods and products to the
public. However, a study of the section's legislative history makes it
quite improbable that the authors contemplated extension of the
principle of strict liability to landlords .... 10l
The court noted that enactment of the section was the result of the
legislature's desire to codify decisions 10 2 such as Javins which had
implied warranties of habitability in leases based on policy consider-
ations of the lease as a contract; 103 such considerations should not
necessarily result in strict liability in tort. 104 Indeed, Curry seemed to
refuse to read even the broad language of Park West105 as requiring
such liability.10 6
Considering the plight of modern day tenants and the traditionally
superior bargaining position of the landlord, it is only fair that, when
neither the landlord nor the tenant is at fault, the burden of loss
should fall upon the one who is best able to bear it. The landlord who
is in the business of renting should make it his business to learn the
nature of his premises and prevent his rental units from deteriorating
to a point such that the tenant is no longer getting what he bargained
for-habitable living space. Simple notions of justice and fairness
would seem to dictate that, under appropriate circumstances, Kaplan
and McBride should be followed, not Curry, and strict liability should
be imposed.
B. Third Party Recovery
New York courts that allow recovery in tort for breach of section
235-b under a strict liability theory-recovery which has not been
foreclosed by Park West-will be faced with the additional question
of whether third parties should be allowed to recover.10 7 In view of
101. Id. at 535, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 536, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 307. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying
text for discussion of Javins.
104. Id.
105. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
106. 77 A.D.2d at 536, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 307. Curry cited Park West but did not
comment on the implications of the court of appeals' description of the landlord's
obligation as "unqualified."
107. This problem has faced the courts in Louisiana, a jurisdiction which enacted
a strict liability-implied warranty of habitability statute during the nineteenth cen-
tury. The provision states:
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recent expansions in strict products liability 08 and landlord tort liabil-
ity, 109 it is possible that courts will permit plaintiffs other than tenants
to recover consequential damages. In so holding, courts may rely
upon the similiarity between section 235-b and the implied warranty
of merchantability for the sale of goods, under which third parties
have been permitted to recover consequential damages." 0 Pursuant
The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the
thing, which may prevent its being used even in case it should appear he
knew nothing of the existence of such vices and defects, at the time the
lease was made, and even if they have arisen since, provided they do not
arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result to the lessee
from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify him for
the same.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2695 (West 1952). For a discussion of the Louisiana provision, see
Love, supra note 1, at 142-44. A few Louisiana courts have permitted recovery only
by the lessee, the party to whom the warranty is made. See, e.g., Jordan v. Palm
Apts., 353 So. 2d 1120, writ granted, 355 So. 2d 263 (1978) (tenant's wife considered
to be a third party who could recover from the landlord only upon proof of negli-
gence); Hurky v. J.C. Penney, 140 So. 2d 445 (1962) (wife of tenant considered a
third party rather than a tenant); Duplain v. Wiltz, 194 So. 60 (1940) (obligation of
the lessor under the statute runs only to lessee). By contrast, a few courts have
permitted the tenant's immediate family to recover. See, e.g., Landry v. Bleu, 172
So. 19 (1941) (lessee contracted for a home for his wife and family so that they
acquired an interest in the lease). Other third parties that are able to recover include
sub-tenants, see Hughes v. Abate, 2 So. 2d 68 (1941) (landlord is an owner not a
"lessor" vis-a-vis the subtenants); but see Cheatham v. Bohrer, 17 So. 2d 492 (1944)
(statute does not run in favor of any third parties); and a tenant's invited guests,
Ward v. Conn., 344 So. 2d 60 (1977) (same standard of strict liability for damages
for personal injuries applies to third parties on lessor's premises, but court found for
landlord because plaintiffs failed to prove existence of the defect). It seems that a
tenant's employee is not able to recover under the statute. Quintanilla v. Chateau
Louisiane, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. La. 1975).
108. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
109. The most notable example is Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868,
386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976), in which the court of appeals abolished the traditional
distinctions between an invitee, licensee and trespasser and imposed a single standard
of reasonable care on owners and occupiers of land. At common law, the status of the
plaintiff determined the duty owed by the landowner, and classification of the
plaintiff was often difficult. 40 N.Y.2d at 239, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
567. As the concurring opinion noted:
As the economy shifted from an agrarian to an industrial base ...a
corresponding change in social policy, one less favorable to the landowner
or possessor occurred. No longer does the policy of unrestricted freedom to
use one's land, which has usually meant no more than a desire to be free of
the burden and expense of taking precautions, inevitably outweigh consid-
erations of human safety. . ..
40 N.Y.2d at 246, 352 N.E.2d at 875, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 571 (Breitel, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
110. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (9th ed. West 1978). When the Ameri-
can Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drafted the Uniform Commercial Code, they drafted three alternatives with
respect to third party beneficiaries of warranties:
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to the implied warranty of habitability, recovery has been permitted
under traditional contract theories where compensatory damages are
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or
be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the
person of an individual to whom the warranty extends. As amended 1966.
Id.
Recovery under a warranty theory (contract) as opposed to strict liability (tort) is a
confusing area of the law. A characteristic of a warranty action is that culpability is
irrelevant. W. PRossm, supra note 35, at 636. However, conceptual problems are
created when a plaintiff who is not a buyer (i.e., not in privity) is allowed to recover
consequential damages (personal injury or property damage) for breach of the war-
ranty. See Note, Products Liability in New York: Section 2-318 of the U. C. C.-The
Amendment Without a Cause, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 61, 67 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Products Liability in New York]. This is because traditionally there could be no
warranty suit without privity. Gimenez v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390,
191 N.E. 27 (1934). Thus, third party recovery was not a true sales warranty action
but a new tort action. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Rather than recognize this, the New York
Court of Appeals abolished the requirement of privity in a warranty suit, MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Not until 1963 did that
court recognize the new tort action (strict liability) while retaining the language of
warranty. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
In 1962, when the New York State Legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code, ch. 553, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1687 (effective in 1964), it was clear that actions
brought under the theory of breach of warranty were governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code rather than by tort law. Differences include notice requirements,
N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (McKinney 1964), privity, id. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp.
1981), the effectiveness of disclaimers, id. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964), and the statute
of limitations, id. § 2-725. Products Liability in New York, supra, at 63-64, 70-71.
New York courts, unwilling to hold personal injury plaintiffs to commercial stand-
ards, adopted a separate strict liability action in Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330,
298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). Products Liability in New York, supra, at
71. Thus, there was a strict line of demarcation between strict liability and warranty
actions. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1976); Products Liability in New York, supra, at 72.
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awarded1 ' and under strict liability where consequential damages
are awarded." 2 Because both theories are applied within the context
of a single action, it is important to keep in mind the fundamental
differences between the two theories. Although the recovery of com-
pensatory damages is restricted by the contractual concept of priv-
ity, 1" 3 recovery under strict liability, if considered an independent
action, would not be limited to any specific class of plaintiff. Recovery
of consequential damages should be restricted in the same way as
compensatory damages under contract theories, to tenants and in-
tended third parties, because strict liability is a part of the implied
warranty of habitability action.
There are other arguments which militate against third party re-
covery under the implied warranty of habitability. Most importantly,
it is unlikely that the state legislature intended plaintiffs other than
tenants to be able to sue under section 235-b. Although the legislative
history of the provision' 14 neither advocates nor precludes third party
recovery, the language of the statute itself strongly suggests that it
should be barred-indeed the statute specifically utilizes the words
"tenants," "residents" and "occupants."" 5 In employing such lan-
guage, the legislature intended to put "the tenant in parity legally
with the landlord."" 6  Moreover, section 235-b and its legislative
history speaks of remedies "available to a tenant" ' and states that
"the occupants will not be subjected to any conditions which would be
dangerous to their life, health or safety."" 8 To impose an "unquali-
fied obligation" 1' 9 on the landlord with respect to every person who
comes on the premises would create an unduly harsh burden in view
of the absence of a statutory mandate.
When the New York State Legislature amended U.C.C. § 2-318 in order to expand
the scope of the warranty protection to third parties, see note 122 infra, the distinc-
tion between the two actions was again blurred. Thus, under present New York law,
both causes of action are available to one injured by a defective product even though
privity is lacking. Products Liability in New York, supra, at 74-75.
111. In Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d
1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979), the court measured
damages under contract theories, but did not preclude other standards.
112. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1976).
113. See note 110 supra.
114. See note 60 supra and notes 117-18 infra.
115. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). See note 3 supra
for the text of § 235-b.
116. Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y. 2d 316, 325, 391 N.E.2d
1288, 1293, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 315, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979), citing 1975
SEN. J. 7766-76 (remarks of Sen. Barclay).
117. Memorandum of Sen. H. Douglas Barclay, 1975 N.Y. LECIS. ANN. 315.
118. Governor's Memorandum of Approval, 1975 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 437.
119. 47 N.Y.2d at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 1294, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
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In a case of first impression, Hard v. Alwalt Realty Corp.,' 20 the
supreme court, special term, addressed the question of legislative
intent and refused to apply strict liability, thus denying third party
recovery. In Hard, the plaintiff was injured when he stepped on a
marble stair which cracked and fell. The court stated that even if
Kaplan were the law in New York, third parties would not be able to
recover consequential damages on a strict liability theory for breach of
section 235-b. 12'
Where the New York State Legislature intended third parties to
recover, it has enacted such a provision. As codified in New York,
U.C.C. § 2-318 expressly states that a third party beneficiary of a
warranty is any person who reasonably may be expected to be af-
fected by the goods, absent any intent to benefit the injured party. 122
Thus, although section 235-b allows the judiciary to fashion remedies
of the tenant, 123 courts should not extend the warranty of habitability
to protect other individuals. This is not to say, however, that the only
persons protected by the warranty should be those whose names are
on the lease. While a modern lease is a contract containing an implied
120. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 1977, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
121. "Obviously, the policy considerations differ. The warranty arises from the
landlord-tenant relationship." Id. The court in Hard failed to address the analogy to
the law of sales. See Curry v. New York City Hous. Auth., 77 A.D.2d at 535, 430
N.Y.S.2d at 307. See note 62 supra for policy considerations in implying a warranty
of habitability.
Although the existence of an uninhabitable condition may affect others
lawfully upon the property, as was the plantiff here, there is no authority
shown to impose strict or absolute liability on the landlord here. To do so
would make the landlord an insurer of the safety of all persons in or
passing through the building, and would make the landlord responsible in
damages for any injury sustained as a result of any defect, whether or not
he knew or should have known of the defect .... Whether the Legislature
considered an extension of the warranty to apply to all persons lawfully on
the premises does not appear, either from the legislative history or from
the Governor's Memorandum approving the enactment. Although the
Memorandum left to the courts the responsibility for furnishing appropri-
ate remedies, it would appear that any further extension of liability is a
matter for the Legislature, not for this court on motion to amend a
complaint.
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 1977, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
122. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
New York originally adopted Alternative A, see note 110 supra, but struck the words
"who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home," 1975
N.Y. Laws ch. 774, and thereby essentially adopted Alternative B.
123. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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warranty of habitability, 124 limiting recovery under strict liability to
those actually in privity with the landlord would be unduly restric-
tive.
Recent products liability decisions 125 have dispensed with the tradi-
tional requirement of privity 128 and have allowed recovery on strict
liability grounds under implied warranties of fitness or merchantabil-
ity even by remote bystanders who were not users of the defective
product. 127 Courts have advanced two reasons in particular for this
expansion of liability: (1) the manufacturer invites reliance 12 on the
fitness of the product through mass advertising; 129 and (2) given the
system of mass production, imposition of the costs of expanded liabil-
ity on the manufacturer who possesses greater financial resources is
more equitable and encourages product safety. 30  Although these
arguments are persuasive in the area of products liability law, they
should not apply to third party recovery under section 235-b. First, in
the context of a landlord-tenant relationship, it is unlikely that a third
party, other than a co-occupant13 ' of the tenant, would rely on a
landlord's representation to the tenant that the premises were fit for
habitation-there is no mass advertising or labeling. The landlord's
124. 47 N.Y.2d at 324, 391 N.E.2d at 1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
125. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1973); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
126. See, e.g., Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 74, 161 N.E.
423, 424 (1928).
127. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
128. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 13, 181
N.E.2d 399, 402-03, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 368 (1962).
The manufacturer ... unquestionably intends and expects that the prod-
uct will be purchased and used in reliance upon his express assurance of its
quality and, in fact, it is so purchased and used. Having invited and
solicited the use, the manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid
responsibility, when the expected use leads to injury and loss, by claiming
that he made no contract directly with the user.
129.
The world of merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world of direct
contract; it is, rather, a world of advertising and, when representations
expressed and disseminated in the mass communications media and on
labels (attached to the goods themselves) prove false and the user or
consumer is damaged by reason of his reliance on those representations, it
is difficult to justify the manufacturer's denial of liability on the sole
ground of the absence of technical privity.
Id. at 12, 181 N.E.2d at 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
130. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d at 341, 298 N.E.2d at 627-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d at
468.
131. A "co-occupant" as used in this Note is someone whose name does not appear
on the lease but who nevertheless shares the apartment with a tenant promisee.
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representation that the premises are habitable is a representation to
the tenant. Thus, the duty should not extend to third parties. More-
over, due to the statutory ceiling imposed on the amount of rent
recoverable by landlords under Rent Stabilization and Rent Control
laws, 1 32 the landlord would be penalized, having lost the right of
transferring increased costs from expanded liability to the tenant. 33
Therefore, courts should restrict the class of plaintiffs permitted to
recover under strict liability for breach of section 235-b.
The third party beneficiary theory developed in contract law pro-
vides that any person who would benefit by performance of the
contract should be allowed to enforce it-even in the absence of
privity' 34-if there has been an "intent to benefit" him.1 35 If applied
in the context of the implied warranty of habitability, third party
beneficiary principles would limit recovery according to the tenant's
intentions 3 in light of the terms of the lease and the circumstances
surrounding it. 37 The test should be, whom did the tenant expect
would occupy the premises at the time of the signing of the lease? 138
As courts have emphasized, the warranty arises out of the landlord-
tenant relationship. 139 Therefore, only those intended to be benefit-
ted by the creation of this relationship and the lease agreement should
132. Rent Stabilization Law, NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ YY51-1.0-70,
codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney Supp. 1981-82); N.Y. City Rent and
Rehabilitation Law, NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § Y51-1.0, codified at N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). Indeed, this distinction was noted by
the Kaplan court. Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 750, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634, 638
(Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1976).
133. Increased costs borne by the manufacturer "will ultimately be passed on...
to the purchasing users . . .[and] considerations of competitive disadvantage will
delay or dilute automatic transferral of such added costs" which would result in
higher prices to the consumer. 32 N.Y.2d at 341, 298 N.E.2d at 627-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d
at 468. Such a curb on transferral of costs created through competition does not exist
in the present tight rental housing market, however. For example, in Manhattan, the
apartment vacancy rate south of 96th street is approximately 1 %, far below the 5 %
figure considered desirable in urban areas with a healthy rental market. Apartment
Crush Alters Manahattan Living, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1980, at Al, col. 1.
134. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17-1 (2d ed. 1977).
135. Id. § 17-2; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307 (1927).
136. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 134, § 17-2; Hamill v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954); McCulloch v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 53 F.
Supp. 534 (D.Minn. 1943).
137. J. CALAMARI & J. Perillo, supra note 134, § 17-2.
138. Certainly, a tenant intends to benefit his immediate family by the lease if he
intends that they will occupy the same premises. Cf. Landry v. Le Bleu, 172 So. 19
(1941), where lessee contracted for a home for his family, and the Louisiana court
ruled that the family could recover.
139. Hard v. Alwalt Realty Corp., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 1977, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County).
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be protected in strict liability by section 235-b. Reasonable limits must
be placed on the liability of the landlord who, nevertheless, owes a
strong duty to his tenants. 1
40
C. Remedies for Breach of Section 235-b
The imposition of strict liability for injuries caused by breach of
section 235-b and the possibility that third parties may be able to
recover under the theory both raise the question of the propriety of
certain remedies. Although the state legislature expressly left open the
kinds of relief available to tenants in order to allow for flexibility,
14 1
the availability of certain remedies coupled with an expansion in the
140. The extension of protection afforded by the New York Rent Control provi-
sions can be applied by analogy to determine who shall be able to recover consequen-
tial damages on a strict liability theory for breach of the warranty of habitability.
Section 56(d) of the City Rent and Eviction Regulations, passed by the N.Y.C.
Housing and Development Administration pursuant to statutory authority, N.Y.
CITY RENT AND EVICTION REGULATIONS § 56(d), codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
(McKinney 1974), states that no "occupant of housing accommodations" shall be
evicted from a rent controlled apartment where the occupant is either "the surviving
spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family
who is living with him." (There is an identical provision in the State Rent and
Eviction Regulations § 56(4), codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney 1974)).
This language has been construed to preclude anyone who is not a spouse or a lineal
descendant of the tenant, thereby precluding aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, etc.,
from the protection of rent control. Cesbron v. Reardon, 73 Misc. 2d 715, 343
N.Y.S.2d 163 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1973). However, other courts have construed
the language to protect a tenant's parents, Bierer v. Abrams, 20 Misc. 2d 1085, 201
N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956); a tenant's mother-in-law and sister-in-
law, Waitzman v. McGoldrick, 20 Misc. 2d 1085, 121 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1953); and a tenant's nephew, Bistany v. Williams, 83 Misc. 2d 228, 372
N.Y.S.2d 6 (City Ct. Yonkers 1975) (extending Rent Control protection beyond the
tenant's "immediate family" to a group which also includes "not only the servants but
also the head of the household and all persons in it related by blood or marriage," id.
at 229, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 7). In each case, the person to whom protection was extended
resided with the tenant. In Zimmerman v. Burton, 107 Misc. 2d 401, 434 N.Y.S.2d
127 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980), the court extended Rent Control protection to a
person who cohabited with the tenant "for a significant period of time in a partner-
ship closely akin to marriage." Id. at 402, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 128. Thus, it appears that
the courts are moving toward a species of "intent to benefit" test to construe the Rent
Control protection provisions. In each case, the person seeking protection lived with
the tenant and was intended by the tenant to both live with the tenant and get the
benefits of the lease. Recent expansion of landowner tort liability, see note 179 infra,
should not result in an inconsistent application of the law or a resurrection of the
common law distinctions eliminated by Basso v. Miller if limited third party recovery
is permitted under a strict liability theory. This Note's proposal applies only to
landlords who must conform to § 235-b-not to other landowners. Residential land-
lords are under a statutory duty to keep premises habitable, a duty not shared by
other landowners.
141. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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class of permitted plaintiffs may result in a heavy financial burden on
the landlord.
The award of compensatory damages, the basic remedy available to
the tenant for breach of section 235-b, will not impose a severe
economic burden on landlords if courts permit limited third party
recovery in strict liability. 42  As the New York Court of Appeals
142. Compensatory damages compensate the wronged party or restore him to his
original position, e.g., the reduction in rental value. Reid v. Terwilliger, 116 N.Y.
530, 22 N.E. 1091 (1889). A dispute arose in the courts with regard to the level of
proof required to substantiate a claim for damages. In Steinberg v. Carreras, the
appellate term rejected the opinion of the court as to the money valuation of the
deprived services, based on the testimony of the tenant. Steinberg v. Carreras, 74
Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136, rev'd in part, 77 Misc. 2d 774, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369
(App. Term 1974) (set off against rent in arrears). At least one court awarded only
nominal damages on the constraint of this decision despite its observation that expert
testimony was neither necessary nor practical. Groner v. Lakeview Management
Corp., 83 Misc. 2d 932, 373 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1975). See also 631
Realty, Ltd. v. Harvey Greiff, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1975, at 9, col. 2 (Civ. Ct.
Kings County). In response to Steinberg, the legislature amended the statute in 1976
to state expressly that the court need not require expert testimony. N.Y. REAL PRO),.
LAW § 235-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). Opinions of the tenant and landlord now
serve as competent evidence of the diminution in value due to the breach, Park West
Management Corp, v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d at 329-30, 391 N.E.2d at 1295, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 317. The trial court determines the value of the services of which the
tenant is deprived. N Town Roosevelt Ass'n v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 6,
col. 4 (App. Term). On the other hand, because mere temporary inconveniences and
annoyances to the tenant will not constitue a breach of the warranty, damages may
not be ascertained by mere conjecture or guess work. Goldner v. Doknovitch, 88
Misc. 2d 88, 388 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Term 1976) (retrial ordered due to inadequate
proof of damages-tenants fixed no sum in their answer as to the amount claimed as
a setoff, and they offered no testimony as to the reduced rental value of the premises);
see also Schwartz v. Jiminez, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1976, at 14, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County); Ocean Rock Assoc. v. Cruz, 66 A.D.2d 878, 879, 411 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664 (2d
Dep't 1978), aJJ'd, 51 N.Y.2d 1001, 417 N.E.2d 93, 435 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1980) (Martu-
sello, J., dissenting). Absent some reasonable basis for determining damages, only
nominal damages may be awarded. 88 Misc. 2d at 91, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 507. "Where
it can reasonably be expected that evidence can be furnished from which reasonable
men can derive substantial data for fixing the amount of damages, such evidence
must be produced." Id. at 91, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 507. See York, Implied Warranty of
Habitability, N.Y.L.J., May 12, 1976, at 1, col. 2. For example, some courts have
held that the cost of repairs made by the tenant, after notice to the landlord, is a basis
for determining damages. But see Villa Victoria Realty Co. v. Glass, N.Y.L.J., July
1, 1981, at 10, col. 6 (App. Term); Kekllas v. Saddy, 88 Misc. 2d 1042, 389 N.Y.S.2d
756 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1976); Pantalis v. Archer, 87 Misc. 2d 205, 384
N.Y.S.2d 678 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1976). See also Hilary Gardens v. Dutcher,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1976, at 14, col. 2 (Civ. Ct.) (damages included additional costs
tenant incurred eating at restaurants because of a defective stove); Schwartz v.
Jiminez, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1976, at 14, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County) (fair market
value of the premises is what the tenant could have charged to sublet). One court has
viewed the inability to rely on the landlord's services as an independent factor in
awarding damages. 111 East 88th Partners v. Simon, 106 Misc. 2d 693, 434 N.Y.S.2d
886 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
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stated in Park West, the measure of damages usually should be "the
difference between the fair market value of the premises if they had
been as warranted, as measured by the rent reserved under the lease,
and the value of the premises during the period of the breach." 143 The
rationale for such a measure of damages is premised upon the contract
theory of leases: "the duty of the tenant to pay rent is coextensive with
the landlord's duty to maintain the premises in habitable condi-
tion."144 Under this theory, third parties should not be able to re-
cover for diminished value to the property.
More problematic has been the issue of consequential damages 145
for either personal Or property injury due to a breach of section 235-b.
Several recent cases have denied the tenant recovery for consequential
damages. 146  A few courts, however, have allowed consequential
damages under warranty law. 147  For example, the Civil Court of
New York County allowed damages for "disruption of daily living." 148
143. Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 329, 391 N.E.2d
.1288, 1295, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 317 (1979).
144. Id. at 329, 391 N.E.2d at 1295, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 317. The continued payment
of rent is not an implied waiver of the right to damages for violation of the statute. N
Town Roosevelt Ass'n v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 6, col. 4 (App. Term);
Tidespy Corp. v. Third World Culture Cent., N.Y.L.J., March 23, 1979, at 6, col. I
(App. Term); Stahl v. A. M. & P. M. Products, N.Y.L.J., March 1, 1979, at 7, col. 5
(App. Term); 350 Associates v. Feldman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1978, at 13, col. 6 (App.
Term); 111 East 88th Partners v. Simon, 106 Misc. 2d 693, 434 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1980). But see Cosmopolitian Assoc. v. Ortega, 90 Misc. 2d 437, 395
N.Y.S.2d 358 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1977).
145. Compensatory damages may be either general (damages which naturally and
obviously flow from the breach) or consequential (not natural, but a necessary result
of the wrong, i.e., they arise from the special circumstances of the case). Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
146. Villa Victoria Realty Co. v. Glass, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1981, at 10, col. 5 (App.
Term); N Town Roosevelt Ass'n v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 6, col. 4 (App.
Term). In Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby, 101 Misc. 2d 586, 421 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Civ.
Ct. Kings County 1979), the court allowed the tenant to recover lost wages caused by
his inability to leave the building due to a broken elevator. The appellate term,
however, reversed, holding that no consequential damages are recoverable for
breach of the warranty of habitability. Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby, N.Y.L.J., Apr.
23, 1981, at 11, col. 5 (App. Term).
In N Town Roosevelt Ass'n v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 6, col. 4 (App.
Term), the court relied on the Park West formula but ignored the New York Court of
Appeals' express reservation that the formula should not foreclose other possible
remedies. Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d at 329, 391 N.E.2d
at 1295, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
147. McBride v. 218 E. 70th St. Assoc., 102 Misc. 2d 279, 425 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App.
Term 1979); McGuiness v. Jakubiak, 106 Misc. 2d 317, 431 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1980).
148. Goodman v. Ramirez, 100 Misc. 2d 881, 883, 420 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
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It reasoned that damages for breach of the implied warranty of fitness
in the law of sales-which provides a ready analogy to the warranty
of habitability-have exceeded mere reduction in rental value.
49
Breach of warranty, the court explained, has been regarded as a
hybrid concept involving elements of both tort and contract for which
foreseeable, consequential damages may be awarded.
150
For policy reasons, courts have allowed punitive damages' 15 for
breach of the warranty of habitability under a negligence theory
where there is evidence of actual malice or such wantonness or reck-
lessness as to permit an inference of malice. 152 By awarding punitive
149. Id. at 888, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
150. Similarly, the dissent in N Town Roosevelt Ass'n v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
27, 1980, at 6, col. 4, 5 (App. Term) (Asch, J., dissenting), explained why attempted
distinctions between tort and contract are not valid. First, it is counterproductive to
adhere compulsively to contract and tort distinctions. Categories are formulated to
bring about socially appropriate legal ends, and they must yield ultimately to new
configurations which are more appropriate for contemporary problems. Id. at col. 5.
"Today the pressures for relevant legal remedies more attuned to the flux in our
society are breaking down traditional boundaries between contract and tort law."
Id. Second, contract and tort distinctions are irrelevant with respect to whether
damages sustained by a tenant's property should be considered in determining the
amount of rent abatement. Id. at col. 6. The dissent argued that recovery of conse-
quential damages should be limited to the fair market value of the premises. This
would not, however, preclude the tenant from bringing a separate action in tort. Id.
Despite the reasons for awarding consequential damages for breach of § 235-b,
some courts, relying on Curry v. New York City Hous. Auth., 77 A.D.2d 534, 430
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1st Dep't 1980), see notes 94-101 supra and accompanying text, have
been reluctant to award them under a strict liability theory. See, e.g., Villa Victoria
Realty Co. v. Glass, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1981, at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.); Bay Park One
Co. v. Crosby, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1981, at 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.); N Town Roosevelt
Ass'n v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). In Mahlmann v.
Yelverton, 109 Misc. 2d 127, 439 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1980), the
court did not mention Curry in denying consequential damages, but rather relied on
what it assessed to be the weight of legislative intent and case law precedents. Id. at
132, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 571. Strict liability can be applied to both compensatory and
consequential damages, or to compensatory damages alone. See N Town Roosevelt
Ass'n v. Muller, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.) (Asch, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that strict liability be applied to compensatory damages arising from the
landlord's breach of the warranty of habitability, but requiring a separate action in
tort for consequential damages). See generally Newburgh, Assessing Damages under
the Warranty of Habitability, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
151. In the analogous area of products liability law, early court decisions declined
to award punitive damages in suits brought under the warranty theory because
punitive damages generally may not be awarded in contract actions. Owen, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICHIGAN L. REV. 1257, 1271 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Owen]. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 134,
§ 14-3, at 520.
152. Hohenberg v. 77 West 55th St. Assoc., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26, 1981, at 7, col. 3
(Sup. Ct.) (punitive damages for conduct which is morally culpable or activated by
evil and reprehensible motives); Century Apartments, Inc. v. Yalkowsky, 106 Misc.
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damages, courts seek to prevent the deterioration, neglect and aban-
donment of residential structures. Punitive damages accomplish this
by punishing the landlord, deterring him from repeating the con-
duct,1 53 and warning other landlords not to follow the same course of
conduct.' 54 For example, in G. J. Eliza Realty Co. v. Mah,' 55 the
Civil Court of New York County awarded compensatory damages to
two tenants of $200 each together with punitive damages of $2,000
each.' 56 In Mah, the plaintiffs alleged that the landlord had placed a
device on the central heating system which was capable of causing the
system to become inoperable; 157 apartment windows had been broken
and never replaced; 58 plumbing, including a kitchen faucet and toi-
let, were not usable; 159 and one apartment was infested with rats and
cockroaches because the tenant had never been notified of the avail-
ability of an exterminator.' 60 The landlord had been informed of
these conditions several times but refused to make the repairs, assert-
ing to one tenant that she could move if she did not like the condition
of the old building.'" 1 The court applied the Park West reduced
value test in fixing compensatory damages and noted that it was
2d 762, 435 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (deliberate delay in repairs);
111 East 88th Partners v. Simon, 106 Misc. 2d 693, 434 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980) (wanton disregard towards tenant's health and safety); 124-26 Mott
Corp. v. Lum, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 6, col. 2 (Civ. Ct.) (rat and roach
infestation, holes in walls, floor and ceilings; landlord allegedly wanted to force
tenants out to avoid rent control); 88 Lex Co. v. Prieser, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1978, at
13, col. 5 (App. Term) (denying punitive damages absent proof of malice); 15 & 19
West 55th St. Realty Co. v. Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., Oct.26, 1977, at 11, col. 2 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County) (landlord unwilling to provide adequate heat and water, reduction 6f
security and cleaning services, and a defective intercom system); Kipsborough Realty
Corp. v. Goldbetter, 81 Misc. 2d 1054, 367 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1975) (deliberate and persistent refusal of landlord for three years to comply with
Multiple Dwelling Law and Administrative Code). See generally Muldoon, War-
ranty of Habitability, Punitive Damages in New York, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1981, at 1,
col. 2.
153. One court stated it would measure punitive damages by an amount intended
to deter others. 124-26 Mott Corp. v. Lum, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 6, col. 2 (Civ.
Ct.).
154. Century Apartments, Inc. v. Yalkowsky, 106 Misc. 2d 762, 435 N.Y.S.2d 627
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); 124-26 Mott Corp. v. Lum, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1979, at
6, col. 2 (Civ. Ct.); G. J. Eliza Realty Co. v. Mah, No. 87931/1980, Sept. 22, 1981
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
155. No. 87931/1980, Sept. 22, 1981 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 2-3.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 3.
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"shocked by the wanton disregard of the health and safety" of the
tenants: 162
To deny punitive damages in this case would encourage serious
violations of the warranty of habitability by assuring the landlord
that its worst consequence of such violation would be an abatement
of the rent which would merely reduce the lease rent to the proper
rental value for the level of services actually provided. 1 3
Indeed, the court noted that a "pattern of inadequate essential serv-
ices, alone" could be a sufficient basis for the award of punitive
damages. 16 4
Similarly, the Civil Court of New York County awarded a tenant
punitive damages in an amount equal to the rent demanded by the
landlord, resulting in a complete setoff, because of the landlord's
willful failure to keep the roof in repair despite persistent complaints
by the tenant over a three-year period. 16 5 The court noted that the
landlord's refusal to comply with the Multiple Dwelling Law and the
Housing Maintenance Code evidenced a malicious, wanton and reck-
less disregard for the law. 1 66
Although decisions such as Mah and Barasch indicate a willingness
to allow recovery of punitive damages where malicious conduct is
shown, some commentators have observed the illogicality of awarding
punitive damages where strict liability is imposed. 6 7 Such criticism
has arisen in the context of products liability law:
where the plaintiff relies solely on strict liability, certain problems
of logic ... arise in regard to a claim for punitive damages. Under
the theory of strict liability, all the plaintiff need show to succeed
in his claim is that the defendant's product was defective and that
the injury was caused by this defect. Punitive damages, on the
other hand, are reserved for situations where the defendant has
done more than inflict injury on others by his negligence or inten-
tional acts. He must have acted maliciously, or with such reckless-
ness as to indicate an indifference to the safety of others, or have
162. Id. at 5.
163. Id. at 5-6.
164. Id. at 6.
165. N.Y.L.J., Apr. 15, 1975, at 17, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
166. Id.
167. Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases, 61 MARQ. L.
REV. 245 (1977); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNS. J.
300 (1972); Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6
GA. L. REV. 613 (1972); Comment, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895 (1976); Note, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation: Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 33 Sw. L. J. 1117 (1979).
[Vol. X
1982] WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
engaged in some other type of behavior which is regarded as so
socially reprehensible as to justify the awarding of punitive dam-
ages. Therefore, such extraordinary damages should not be predi-
cated on the mere showing that the plaintiff was injured due to a
defective product which was manufactured or distributed by de-
fendant. 16
8
Other commentators have refuted this argument that the theories of
strict liability and punitive damages are incompatible on two bases: 169
first, the elimination of proof of fault is only relevant with respect to
establishing liability for compensatory damages and does not preclude
recovery upon proof of aggravated fault; 170 and, second, facts differ-
ent from those supporting the underlying claim for compensatory
damages might support the claim for punitive damages.' 7 ' Following
this reasoning, several courts have awarded punitive damages in strict
products liability cases because such sanctions serve as a "valuable and
effective tool in deterring and punishing misconduct." 72 These argu-
ments, however, have been rejected in New York. The leading inter-
pretation of the New York approach to punitive damages in products
liability cases was set forth by the Second Circuit in Roginsky v.
168. Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GEOR-
CIA L. REV. 613, 626-27 (1972).
169. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 151; Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Cases, 6 PEPPEBDINE L. REV. 139 (1978).
170. Owen, supra note 151, at 1269.
171. Id. at 1269-70.
172. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 308, 294 N.W.2d 437, 461
(1980). See also Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46-47 (Alaska Sup. Ct.
1979) (punitive damages under strict liability theory where plaintiff was able to
prove manufacturer knew that its product was defectively designed and that injuries
and deaths had resulted from the defect but continued to market the product in
reckless disregard of the public's safety); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v.
Aderhold, - Ark. -. -. 616 S.W.2d 720, 726 (1981) (court approved punitive
damages theory, but denied recovery because proof not given to sustain finding of
reckless disregard from which malice could be inferred); Searle & Co. v. Superior
Court of Sacramento County, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225 (1975)
("We suggest conscious disregard of safety as an appropriate description of the
animus malus which may justify an exemplary damage award when nondeliberate
injury is alleged.") (emphasis in original); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251
Cal. App. 2d 689, 713, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 415 (1967) ("Where... there is evidence
that the conduct in question is taken recklessly and without regard to its injurious
consequences, the jury may find malice in fact."); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
297 N.W.2d 727, 732-33 (1980); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 668
(1978) ("[g]iven the purpose of punitive damage to punish a defendant for an
aggravated act of misconduct and to deter similar conduct in the future by the
defendant and others, there is no fundamental reason for excluding [cases brought
under negligence and strict liability theories] from the cases in which punitiye
damages may be recovered").
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Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,' 7 a case in which the plaintiffs alleged that
use of a drug developed to lower blood cholesterol level caused cata-
racts. On its reading of New York State law, the Second Circuit
denied punitive damages: the first punitive award could "exhaust...
all claims .for punitive damages and ... preclude future judg-
ments;" 74 governmental industry regulations, criminal penalties, and
heavy compensatory damages should suffice to meet the goal of deter-
rence; 175 and, finally, the possibility exists that innocent shareholders
could "suffer ... extinction of their investments for a single manage-
ment sin." 176
Although lower New York courts have allowed punitive damages to
be recovered by tenants alleging breach of the implied warranty of
habitability under certain circumstances, 177 recovery by third party
plaintiffs under a strict liability theory should not be permitted. In
view of the fact that the primary purpose of section 235-b is to insure
habitability of premises, 17 limitless recovery by third parties under
strict liability could very well deplete a landlord's resources to the
detriment of tenants. In addition, the legislative history of the implied
warranty indicates that the statute was never intended to punish
landlords. 17  Finally, in light of the logical inconsistency between
strict liability and the recovery of punitive damages, 18 no plaintiff,
whether tenant or third party, should be allowed to recover punitive
damages under this theory unless additional proof of malicious or
wanton conduct is shown.' 8'
IV. Conclusion
It is imperative that tenants be given effective legal rights to protect
their health and safety and provide them with decent housing. The
legislature itself has recognized this and, as a result, has enacted
statutes which place more emphasis on the tenant's rights than on
173. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
174. Id. at 839. Several hundred claims arose because of the manufacture of this
drug. Id. at 834. In three decisions alone, juries had awarded some $2,030,000 in
punitive and compensatory damages. Id. at 834 n.3.
175. Id. at 841.
176. Id.
177. See notes 151-66 supra and accompanying text.
178. "What the tenant wants is service, not vengeance. What the State and City
want-or should want-is compliance not fines." COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 40, 1965 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. at 353.
179. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
181. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
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punishing the landlord. Allowing tenants and intended third party
occupants to recover compensatory and consequential damages in
strict liability for breach of the implied warranty of habitability will
give landlords incentive to maintain residential buildings in a reason-
able fashion. New York courts should adopt a strict liability theory to
enhance the efficacy of section 235-b, but should not allow recovery of
punitive damages under that theory.
Francis S. L'Abbate

